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Abstract
In this paper we take up three terms – containment, delay, mitigation – that
have been used by the UK Government to describe their phased response
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the terms refer to a political and
public health strategy – contain the virus, flatten the peak of the epidemic,
mitigate its effects – we offer a psychosocial reading that draws attention to
the relation between time and care embedded in each term. We do so to
call for the development of a form of care-ful attention under conditions that
tend to prompt action rather than reflection, closing down time for thinking.
Using Adriana   notion of ‘horrorism’, in which violence is enactedCavarero’s
at precisely the point that care is most needed, we discuss the ever-present
possibility of failures   acts of care. We argue that dwelling in thewithin
temporality of delay can be understood as an act of care if delaying allows
us to pay care-ful attention to violence. We then circle back to a point in
twentieth-century history – World War II – that was also concerned with an
existential threat requiring a response from a whole population. Our
purpose is not to invoke a fantasised narrative of ‘Blitz spirit’, but to suggest
that the British psychoanalytic tradition born of that moment offers
resources for understanding how to keep thinking while ‘under fire’ through
containing unbearable anxiety and the capacity for violence in the
intersubjective space and time between people. In conditions of lockdown
and what will be a long and drawn-out ‘after life’ of COVID-19, this
commitment to thinking in and with delay and containment might help to
inhabit this time of waiting – waiting that is the management and mitigation
of a future threat, but also a time of care in and for the present.
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Introduction
On 12th March 2020, Professor Chris Whitty, the UK Government’s 
Chief Medical Advisor, stated in a news conference: ‘We 
are entering a delay phase’. Global ‘containment’ of novel 
coronavirus, first detected in Wuhan, China, had not worked and 
this was now a crisis. COVID-19 was spreading, with Europe as 
its new epicentre. The UK’s own ‘containment’ phase of its 
domestic strategy – testing, quarantine and the tracing of known 
contacts with a patient – was soon abandoned and the UK abruptly 
moved into the more obviously temporal ‘delay’ phase of the 
public health operation (Policy Paper, 2020). Processes of social 
distancing, self-isolation and then, ultimately, ‘lockdown’ were 
instigated in an attempt to lengthen and flatten the peak of the 
outbreak and reduce the number of cases at any one time. This, 
it was hoped, would give the health service a chance of survival 
and help to manage the outbreak in a population assumed to be 
unable to cope with more than 12 weeks in isolation. ‘Timing’, as 
Whitty put it, was ‘everything’ (Whitty, 12 March, 2020). Yet, as 
one National Health Service (NHS) consultant put it as early as 
16th March, despite a month of planning ‘what has blindsided us is 
the speed at which the hypothetical became real and then became 
obsolete’ (Anonymous, 2020a). The increase in cases happened 
so rapidly in a system already operating at almost total capacity 
after a decade of austerity that, according to this anonymous 
report, by 16th March the system was already overwhelmed, even 
though the UK Government claimed in mid-April that hospitals 
were still running ‘below their ceiling’ (Whitty, 13 April, 2020). 
But with cancelled operations and outpatient appointments 
now pushed not into a planned future but a suspended time that 
cannot easily be held in mind, it will take time to know about the 
full secondary health effects of COVID-19 and the results of the 
Government’s interventions. There will be a cascade of impacts on 
the economy and the NHS that will affect the delivery of timely 
healthcare for years to come.
Everywhere we look, the commentary on the COVID-19 pan-
demic focuses on the question of time and timing. These questions 
include: how to make timely interventions – acting swiftly and 
decisively while also trying to instigate practices of waiting and 
delaying; when to instigate and when to end lockdowns that 
suspend and transform the temporalities of work, sociality and 
economic and political activity that play out in acutely uneven 
ways; how to implement systems that wait for ‘the hypothetical’ 
and then are flattened almost immediately;1 managing phenom-
enological experiences in isolation that give rise to time cycling 
or becoming sluggish or of being ‘outside of time’; and the 
prospect of the deep violence of the effects of governmental 
responses to the virus that will not been known about for decades. 
Although the strategy of ‘containment, delay and mitigation’ 
suggests a linear temporality that seems to echo something like 
the progression of a disease, the experience of living with and 
through these phases has suggested a much less straightforward 
set of temporal experiences. Just as diseases themselves frequently 
have much more complex trajectories that include suspensions, 
remissions, recursions, set-backs and recurrences, it has been 
hard to know precisely which phase of the strategy we might 
be inhabiting at any moment, or whether it is either practical or 
ethical to imagine one term superseding the last.
As humanities and social science scholars working on histories 
and experiences of waiting in and for healthcare, we are 
concerned to understand how questions of time intersect with those 
of care in these current times. What are the discourses of care 
being ostensibly offered by ‘containment, delay and mitigation’? 
The mantra that has emerged in the UK has been ‘stay at home; 
protect the NHS; save lives’. The explicitly temporal strategy 
of delay, from where we are currently writing, indeed invokes a 
call for care for an institution that on the one hand retains a 
particular place in the British cultural imaginary (‘our’ NHS, 
as Boris Johnson now repeatedly names it),2 yet on the other is 
routinely described, and experienced by those working within it, 
as ‘dying’. Particularly since the reforms of 2013, the NHS has 
persistently been represented as staggering on in an ongoing and 
enduring crisis brought on by chronic underfunding, creeping 
privatisation and a withdrawal from Europe that has already led 
to further staff shortages, demoralisation and burnout of staff at 
every level.
Public debate has aligned some aspects of the Government’s 
strategy, particularly in its initial articulation, with dangerous 
inaction, while the Government has insisted that the ‘delay’ we are 
now in is a form of care, especially for the most vulnerable. We 
would like to articulate an alternative view in which delay holds 
within itself the possibility for care, but only insofar as it must 
also ‘know’ about violence: violence that might express itself in 
knowingly ‘letting’ certain groups of people die; in exposing 
vulnerability to shame; or in denying responsibility for political 
decisions that have kept the NHS running in permanent crisis. 
These are forms of social violence that entail the intentional 
use of power that results in harm, although they are not always 
recognised in these terms. We argue, here, that knowing about 
these forms of violence relies on using the temporality of delay 
to pay care-ful attention over time to the possibility of harm in 
states of extreme vulnerability and powerlessness. To do this 
we must move in the counter-direction to the UK’s strategy 
(containment to delay to mitigation) and instead begin in delay. 
From there we will work ‘backwards’ to understand ‘containment’ 
through a psychoanalytic lens, in order to finally offer some 
thoughts on what mitigation of harm might mean in a (post) 
COVID-19 context.
Delay
In the opening phase of the UK Government’s strategy of ‘delay’, 
the notion of building ‘herd immunity’ emerged under the auspices 
of a care for ‘lives’ and protection for the ‘most vulnerable’ – those 
over the age of 70 and those with ‘underlying health conditions’. 
But there was already a tense relation here between different 
temporalities. As Boris Johnson suggested in a much-circulated 
interview on 5th March: ‘One of the theories is that perhaps 
1See Flexer, 2020. 2See Bivins et al., 2018. See, also, Moore, 2020.
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you could take it on the chin, take it all in one go and allow the 
disease, as it were, to move through the population, without 
taking as many draconian measures’ (This Morning, 5 March 
2020). In other words, delay might require some populations, 
seemingly those less likely to suffer the most severe effects of 
the virus, to be exposed without delay, while the most vulnerable 
were shielded – contained within their homes. Targeted 
containment and delay, which was never fully actualised as a 
policy, was linked to an idea of ‘strik[ing] a balance’ (This 
Morning, 5 March, 2020) between relatively minor interventions, 
such as advice on hand-washing and moderate social distancing, 
and the more ‘draconian’ strategy of lockdown.3 Yet, as was 
quickly established, the political discourse that took up the 
epidemiological modelling underpinning this strategy dangerously 
condoned a form of thinking in which some lives – the elderly, 
the chronically ill and the disabled – were deemed more expend-
able than others. For many, this particular configuration of ‘delay’ 
was experienced as a form of inaction that seemed all too 
clearly underwritten by an ongoing violence experienced by 
particular populations and articulated by the black feminist poet 
Audre Lorde: ‘some of us were never meant to survive’ (Lorde, 
1978, p. 31).
Can delay then be felt as care; is it indeed care, or is it a form 
of abandonment as some are arguing4 – an abandonment of those 
most in need of care? As is now emerging, those who need care 
include those who contract the virus; the healthcare workers who 
care for them but who may themselves require care; those affected 
by the severe and lasting effects of an economy under lockdown; 
those who find themselves trapped at home in situations that are 
physically and mentally dangerous; those already living in food 
poverty or without homes and unable to self-isolate; those in 
care homes; those in prison; those in forms of work deemed 
essential despite the lack of provision for safe working; or those 
forced to make impossible choices between work and acute states 
of poverty. If it is a form of abandonment at the point that care 
is most needed, then it constitutes what the philosopher Adriana 
Cavarero has called ‘horrorism’ (Cavarero, 2009). Horrorism is a 
form of violence that offends the human subject at an ontological 
rather than socio-political level. It describes a form of violation 
of another that occurs when that other opens themselves, or finds 
themselves open, or is compelled to make themselves open, both 
to care and harm at the same time. An infant might be a para-
digmatic figuration of this form of vulnerability, but in a (post) 
COVID-19 world, so too are many others: keyworkers with no 
protective equipment; detainees who already face shortened life 
expectancies; children who depend on school to provide the only 
meal of the day; and, as is increasingly becoming clear in the global 
north, people of colour – whether those working life-long in the 
UK heath service who represent almost half of all medical profes-
sionals, or those in the US living in urban centres and who, due 
to enduring conditions of racism, have a higher likelihood of not 
being able to access to healthcare. Care, in this case, must avoid 
horrorism. It must not, however unwittingly, inflict harm at the 
very point that care is needed.
We can think of care broadly as a set of social capacities: those 
that are necessary for birthing and raising children; for sustaining 
and maintaining kinship groups and community connections; 
and forms of social reproduction that underpin every aspect of 
capitalism’s proliferation that have always been gendered, classed 
and racialized – women’s work, poor women’s work, poor women 
of colour’s work (Baraitser, 2017). Although we can and should 
pay close attention to ‘state care’ or ‘caring economies’5, the 
often mundane temporalities of socially reproductive labour – 
temporalities of waiting, repeating, staying, returning, maintain-
ing, enduring, persisting – that involve not moving on are easily 
overlooked. Indeed, they are sometimes set against the heroic 
exactitude of the timeliness of healthcare: care in acute situations 
such as cardiac arrest, surgery and A&E settings, even though 
the majority of day-to-day healthcare practices have elongated 
temporalities at their core. Consider the ‘watchful waiting’ rou-
tinely used in general practice in which a patient and practitioner 
must wait to see if and how a symptom develops or whether a 
medication takes hold; the slow unfolding of trust required to 
communicate psychological distress that forms a vital part of the 
therapeutic alliance in mental health treatment; or the uncertain 
and unknowable time of palliative care at the end of life. Even 
Boris Johnson, not always known for his attention to detail, was 
able to acknowledge that during the 48 hours in intensive care 
at St. Thomas’ hospital, London, it was the minute-by-minute 
watchful waiting of two nursing staff, Jenny McGee and Luís 
Pitarma, that enabled his recovery and, in his terms, ‘saved 
my life’ (Johnson, 2020b). When we overlook care that takes 
time, or is itself a practice that waits to see what giving time to 
a situation may bring, we enact the antithesis of care. We fail to 
think carefully about care.
What we might say, then, about care is twofold: that it is bound 
up in particular ways with enduring time, and that it requires a 
form of knowing-about, or thinking-about, the antithesis of care – 
failures to care, horrorism or the perverse pull to enact harm 
when care is most needed. We want to argue that these failures 
can, if we can pay attention to them, bring on new ways of 
thinking – forms of ‘care-ful attention’ whose temporal forms 
are waiting, staying, maintaining, enduring, returning, repeating 
and persisting. Care, from this perspective, is not just a relational 
practice that develops over time, or one that takes time; it is a 
practice that produces time in conditions that are otherwise felt 
to be stuck and unable to change. In her discussion of what she 
calls ‘care time’, Maria Puig de la Bellacasa elaborates how 
care both takes time and involves ‘making time of an unex-
ceptional particular kind’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017, p. 206). 
Although, affectively, care time can be enjoyable, she writes, it is 
also ‘very tiresome, involving a lot of hovering and adjusting to 
the temporal exigencies of the cared for’ (p. 206). Much care in 
an intensive care unit takes just this form. Care time, as Puig de 
la Bellacasa states, is not future-orientated or a matter of righting 
past wrongs, but ‘suspends the future and distends the present’ 3See https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/874290/05-potential-impact-of-behavioural-social-interventions-
on-an-epidemic-of-covid-19-in-uk-1.pdf
4See, for instance, Anthony Costello’s frequent contributions to The Guardian. 5See Care Collective, 2020.
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(p. 207). It produces the time for care-ful attention by pushing 
back on the anticipated joys or indeed horrors of the future, the 
pleasures of the present or the accumulated regrets of the past. In 
this sense care time is the time of delay.
The meaning of delay in English hovers between two contradic-
tory impulses: to put off or defer action, so that delay opens up 
the time of lingering, loitering, dithering or procrastinating; and 
a more forceful impulse that has to do with detaining, holding 
up, making late and hindering progress (OED). On the one hand, 
delaying puts aside the future in the name of a temporal hiatus 
that slows the time of progress and appears to offer an approach to 
present time that might make it possible to grasp it; on the other, 
delay remains futural – the possibility of deferral is precisely 
premised on the yet-to-come, on what Jacques Derrida calls the 
‘a-venir’. For instance, for Derrida, the relational encounters 
of hospitality, justice and mourning all retain their ethical 
potential through the necessity of their postponement, their delay 
(Derrida, 1992; Derrida, 1994; Derrida, 1995). And in the realm 
of politics, for Derrida, there is an imperative for democracy to 
function through this delayed temporality in order that it remains 
open to revision and resists the closure of identity in which all 
difference is eradicated (Derrida, 1997). In the French etymol-
ogy, there is an even clearer distinction between waiting as an 
interval that intervenes in the flow of time (dans un délai) and an 
excessive slowness or being behind the times (retard, attardé). We 
could say that if there is an agony in delay that is distinct from 
simply waiting, it is this awareness that despite the desire to 
foreclose the future and push back the past, to loiter and linger and 
dwell in the delay, there remains a temporal drag that neverthe-
less insists on a relation between past and future. The present is 
never ‘free time’, in other words – freed from its obligations to a 
future based on its experience that it is always already past. Delay, 
rather, reveals how the present drags with it a past that is 
always already obliged to a future. In this sense care that entails 
hovering and adjusting is already weighed down with its cultural 
and historical situatedness, its past lives that it cannot shake off.
What might it mean to go on knowing about this violence in 
the temporality of delay? In Delay of the Heart, the final part of 
David Appelbaum’s three-volume philosophical meditation on 
time and ethics (Appelbaum, 2001), he elaborates delay as 
closely bound up with knowing and the problems of the closure of 
thought – with the way that thought both remembers and projects 
into a future, but is unable to inhabit the present. For Appelbaum, 
as for Locke, thought is essentially retentive in its ‘grasping 
again what was once present’ (Appelbaum, 2001, p. 2), in retriev-
ing conditions from the past and projecting them into the future. 
From this perspective, cognition is parthenogenetic, in the 
sense that it gives birth only to more thought. This is thought’s 
primary concern: to reproduce the conditions of its own 
reproduction through the smooth and uninterrupted operation 
between retention and projection.
But, for Appelbaum, such thought misses something fundamental 
that becomes visible in the temporal hiatus we call delay. In delay 
it appears initially that there are two positions of experience. 
From the perspective of the one lagging behind there is no 
delay, there is only the other who has pulled away at a pace that 
produces a discrepancy and who cannot now inhabit the place 
of being ‘behind’. We can be delayed, but it is the other who 
waits. Delay from this position is denied. From the other 
perspective of the one ahead, delay is a fact: there is another 
who lags. Delay therefore produces two modes of thought: 
denial and fact. But for Appelbaum, there is a third position of 
experience that entails neither fact nor denial. He calls this the 
‘view from the heart’ which breaks into the smooth running and 
endless flow of thought. Delay of the heart is the introduction 
of a somatic element, the heart, into the sphere of cognition. It 
arrests thought and allows a different form of judgment to emerge, 
allowing delay to ‘weigh’ a situation differently from the 
procedures and logics of thought (Applebaum, 2001, p. 5). 
Appelbaum reminds us that the root meaning of delay is laxare, 
to relax or decontract (p. 7). In delay, something in thought, 
then, slackens. The appeal to the heart is not so much a gesture 
towards tenderness or the poetic but an approach to thought in the 
condition called delay that creates a stop in its movement, that 
brings disarray and a new form of relationality: ‘Severed from its 
impulse to self-reproduction, thought is momentarily related to the 
other’ (Applebaum, 2001, p. 7). Thought as the ‘lurching gait of 
projection, the reaching back and throwing ahead’, and thought’s 
essential preoccupation with its own reproduction, is interrupted. 
Delay of the heart operates as a suspension of thought’s movement 
in order to bring on a new form of judgment.
Appelbaum’s appeal to the somatic, to the asynchronous force 
of something that offers a ‘sidewise’ approach to thinking that 
releases the habit of thought from its self-perpetuation, echoes a 
host of other philosophical perspectives – feminist, black feminist 
and Afro-pessimist perspectives in particular – that speak to the 
impossibilities yet necessities of remaining and dwelling in delay, 
not only as an ontology but as a politics and an ethics. Christina 
Sharpe, for instance, names this as ‘wake work’ (Sharpe, 2016). 
‘Wake work’ is the work it takes to go on living in the wake of 
the violence of slavery that cannot be overcome, where both 
mourning and melancholia are suspended, producing a time that 
must nevertheless be endured at a somatic and affective level in 
order that care as a form of thinking can emerge6. The delay of 
the heart interrupts the violence of synchronous thought that 
seeks endlessly to reproduce itself, while refusing to ‘know’ 
about that violence. Such synchronous thought is violent to the 
degree that it denies the existence of what is outside itself and its 
own movements; it fails in its encounter with an other out of 
which something new, a new thought, could emerge. We could 
say that in this sense, delay – the suspension of time but also the 
suspension of the self-reproduction of thinking, of more of the 
same – holds open the possibilities for care for the future at the 
point that it can know about violence.
Containment
If we can conceptualise delay as a form of care – one that 
suspends the impulse within thinking to reproduce itself in its 
failure to know about violence - can we turn this back to think 
about the question of containment, care and time? As we have 
seen, the UK Government’s initial ‘containment’ phase of its 
response to the outbreak of COVID-19 was over by the 12th March. 
6See also the work of Fred Moton on ‘fugitivity’ and living ‘in the break’ (Moton, 
2003); Best and Hartman on Fugitive Justice (Best & Hartman, 2005); and Frank, B. 
Wilderson III on Afropessimism (Wilderson, 2020).
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But the question of containment has not gone away, although it 
is now an issue focused more on the psychosocial than the 
microbiological. In conditions of forced isolation and social 
distancing, questions of how to contain anxiety and fear, of how 
to manage in the delay while knowing about violence, and of how 
to endure ourselves and others during this time of elongated 
waiting, have become pressing7. A recent Review in The Lancet 
of studies of the psychological impact of quarantine concluded 
that where people are suddenly and forcibly rendered passive 
in relation to their circumstances, there is high prevalence of 
symptoms of psychological distress and disorder: emotional 
disturbance, depression, low mood, insomnia, post-traumatic 
stress symptoms, anger, emotional exhaustion and irritability 
(Brooks et al, 2020). Qualitative studies of the SARS outbreak 
identified a range of other psychological responses, including 
confusion, fear, grief and numbness. The Lancet Review 
concludes that ‘the psychological impact of quarantine is 
wide-ranging, substantial, and can be long lasting’ (Brooks 
et al, 2020, p. 8), although it can be mitigated if people are kept 
informed about the decisions taken and can understand and align 
their actions with them8. Waiting in conditions of uncertainty 
becomes particularly disturbing or traumatic when people’s usual 
strategies for dealing with anxiety are removed and when uncer-
tainty becomes overwhelming, as in situations where sources of 
income disappear overnight, when ‘safety nets’ seem unresponsive 
and require waiting far too long, and particularly when the ‘brick 
mother’ that is appealed to in the phrase ‘our NHS’ – an institu-
tion that can provide safety, care and a containment capable of 
holding us together when we are at our most vulnerable – is itself 
perceived to be under immediate existential threat9.
There is a history we can draw on here that ties together a 
socio-historical literature on waiting during times of war in the 
twentieth century and the emergence of the concept of contain-
ment in psychoanalytic thinking in the British School of ‘object 
relations’ psychoanalysis. This latter tradition can be understood 
as a part of a wider attempt to use the relatively new discipline 
of psychoanalysis to understand and perhaps even mitigate the 
devastating violence of the two global, industrialised conflicts 
of the twentieth century (Pick, 2014). In this psychoanalytic 
literature, distress, for example, is not simply imagined as the 
easily comprehensible result of experiences of anxious waiting 
under conditions of threat; rather, the difficulties of waiting 
become entangled with an understanding of psychological 
experiences in general and the management of violent and 
destructive instincts and drives. Suggestively, and as we will 
elaborate below, in this psychoanalytic literature the term 
‘containment’ is used to represent what happens when unbearable 
and existentially threatening states of mind are understood rather 
than enacted. ‘Containment’, in this context, is also the prerequisite 
for the possibility of thinking that could allow itself to know 
about violence.
In 1940, during the waiting time of World War II known in the 
UK as the ‘Phoney War’ (when there were no major military 
land operations on the Western Front and no civilian experiences 
of aerial bombardment), the British psychiatrist and later psy-
choanalyst Wilfred Bion wrote a paper concerned with the 
inevitability of a devastating air-attack on London. There, he 
addressed the likelihood of civilian panic and the potential for an 
‘epidemic of shell-shock’ comparable to what he had observed 
and experienced first-hand in World War I. Responding implic-
itly to Stanley Baldwin’s 1932 statement that the experience 
of ‘total war’, in which military and civilian populations face dev-
astating attacks from the air, was now inevitable – ‘the bomber 
will always get through’ – Bion wrote about the possibility of 
providing ‘psychological A.R.P.’ [air-raid precautions] (Bion, 
1940, p. 195). With the explicit aim of taking care of the civilian 
population newly exposed to military conflict, Bion suggested 
that people must not be left to languish in a kind of waiting 
time in which anxiety could take hold. Instead, as soon as an 
air-raid siren goes off, ‘[t]he alarm […] must be a call to action, 
and there must be an action to which every man and woman 
is called’ (Bion, 1940, p. 189). In particular, Bion drew atten-
tion to the fact that isolation itself ‘can help produce that loss 
of social sense that is one of the characteristics of panic fear’ 
(Bion, 1940, p. 185). Isolated and isolating waiting, which 
can lead to mental distress or what the later Bion described in 
1962 as ‘a nameless dread’ (Bion, 1984b, p. 116), must be 
replaced with communal, careful effort directed towards need 
in the present and the idea of a survivable future.
It is important both to note and trouble the ways that the current 
coronavirus crisis has been framed in the UK by looking back to 
World War II. In the second of his daily briefings on 16 March to 
the nation, Boris Johnson spoke of the need to take ‘steps that are 
unprecedented since World War II’ and of acting ‘like any wartime 
government’ (Johnson, 2020a), reaching for a wartime imaginary 
in calls for national unity and resolve. For the British civilian 
population in general did not collapse in the face of aerial bom-
bardment in the way many feared it might, although the idea that 
people did not experience psychological distress and lasting 
trauma from the Blitz was, first, useful propaganda (see London 
Can Take It!, 1940), and later a significant part of the mythology 
mobilised to shape ideas of postwar British exceptionalism. The 
establishment of the NHS in 1948 was also a direct response 
to the Beveridge report of 1942 that sought to produce a 
Welfare State capable of supporting reconstruction and aimed at 
rewarding national efforts and wartime sacrifice. The injunction 
to ‘save the NHS’, displayed prominently on the podium during 
the UK Government’s daily briefings, thus also makes a 
significant link back to that conflict and the postwar settlement.
7A recent Ipsos MORI poll has suggested that people are more concerned by the 
effects of social and psychological response to the pandemic than the physical illness 
COVID-19 (Holmes et al, 2020, pp. 1–2).
8This matches Healthwatch’s 2019 submission to NHS England on people’s views 
on A&E waiting times. The report concluded that those who are triaged on arrival, 
have the next steps explained to them and are kept informed of changes due to other 
circumstances, are more positive about their experience, even if they end up waiting 
a long time.
9The term ‘brick mother’ was used by Henri Rey, who had a strong influence on 
trainee psychiatrists in the Maudsley Hospital in South London in the post-World 
War II period. For him, the term evoked an idea of safety, continuity, stability and 
asylum – in its true sense – for patients who were frightened of breaking down. For 
further on the sense of the NHS under threat, see Moore, 2020.
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Of course, the archive tells a more complex story of the reality 
of the waiting during World War II than a straightforward 
narrative of resolve and ‘pulling together’. Although admissions 
to psychiatric hospitals declined in 1940 in comparison to 1939 
(Jones, 2012, p.31), the detailed report of the psychological 
effects of bombing in the city of Hull (Burney, 2012), for 
instance, demonstrated that experiences of fear and anxiety 
produced considerable and lasting trauma, if not total civilian 
collapse. Many people did make good use of the call to 
communal action, however: some by taking on roles on the Home 
Front explicitly associated with the war effort; others working 
at living on and getting on through domestic practices in which 
a relationship to an imaginable near future was maintained. This 
is matched in the present moment by the speedy emergence of 
community care networks, the revival of mutual aid groups 
and significant levels of volunteering to support NHS provision. 
As we write, the effects of a large-scale loss of life and its 
inevitable griefs and traumas, felt at both an individual and 
collective level, are breaking through the period of anxious 
waiting. Nevertheless, the traumatic effects of waiting and 
enduring through the lockdown persist alongside the imminence 
of existential threat. The desire both to ‘look after’ and be ‘looked 
after’ sits in a paradoxical relationship to modes where 
waiting – which might be care, but also might be violence and 
neglect – seems like the only thing to be ‘done’.
Between 1946 and 1952, Bion undertook an analysis with 
Melanie Klein, who had moved from Berlin to London in 1925. 
Bion went on to work closely with Klein’s idea of ‘projective 
identification’, which can be described as the way we may 
initially defend ourselves from impossibly difficult emotional 
experiences by temporarily splitting off undesired and sometimes 
valued parts of the personality and putting them into another 
person. For Klein and Bion, projective identification represented 
the lifelong repetition of experiences of early life in which the 
baby’s need, hate, love and its fear of death, were projected into 
a primary care-giver who would hopefully be ‘capable of 
reception of the infant’s projective identifications whether they 
are felt by the infant to be good or bad’ (Bion, 1984b, p. 36). In 
receiving them in this way, the carer ‘contained’ and proc-
essed these elements – in Bion’s terms they ‘digested’ them – in 
a way that enabled the infant to feel it was ‘receiving its 
frightened personality back again but in a form it can tolerate’ 
(Bion, 1984a, p. 115). For Bion, then, a crucial part of early devel-
opment was the child’s experience of care-givers who could be 
relied on to act as containers for their projective identifica-
tions and offer them back in forms that could be experienced as 
nourishing rather than destructive or contaminating.
Bion went on to represent projective identifications as particular 
kinds of thoughts that are full of feeling; indeed, he suggested in 
a 1962 essay that thinking evolves as a capacity for containing, 
absorbing and processing ‘thoughts’ otherwise experienced as 
intolerable. Bion believed, however, that such thoughts were vital 
communications that needed to be understood, and ‘containment’ 
became his term for the capacity of one individual (or a group or 
even an institution) to hear, absorb and work to understand the 
projections of another person as a meaningful communication. 
The task became to understand and convey these split off and 
projected thoughts back in a modified form that could, over time, 
be tolerated. For Bion, the aim of psychoanalysis was thus for 
analyst and analysand to suspend the unreflexive action that 
would risk getting rid of ‘thoughts’ experienced as contami-
nating or lacerating to the self and instead to hold, absorb and 
digest them over time and within psychical understanding. 
Containment became the process through which the analyst 
processed and gave back the feelings within thoughts as material 
with which one might think.
In his 1940 Penguin Special, The Psychology of Fear and 
Courage, the psychoanalyst Edward Glover described how 
humans can be like bombs: ‘people are charged with high 
explosives, in other words with very powerful, and sometimes 
uncontrollable, emotions’ and they ‘split where the cover is 
thinnest, that is to say, where our defences are weakest’ (Glover, 
1940, p. 27). Such a metaphor was timely for a book published 
as the ‘Battle of Britain’ was raging, but, even decades after both 
wars, Bion continued to describe ‘thoughts’ via an imaginary of 
bombs and missiles. For him, the only way to transform thoughts 
experienced as aerial bombardment was to suspend the mobilisa-
tion that sought to rid the psyche of them, what he called ‘evasion 
by evacuation’ (Bion, 1984a, p. 117). Instead, he said that analyst 
and patient must learn together how to wait and to think, using 
time itself as a container. For if thoughts are ‘evacuated at high 
speed as missiles’ (Bion, 1984a, p. 113), genuine thinking becomes 
a space of containment that allows the violence of the world to 
be taken into the self and digested over and through time, rather 
than unthinkingly expelled as invasive or intolerable. Such think-
ing, imagined according to the processes of a body able to digest 
rather than be torn open by explosive, incendiary ‘thoughts’, 
produces a space and time where violence might be suspended, 
delayed and therefore thought about, rather than simply 
enacted. Although there were practical benefits in encouraging 
communal, collective action to contain the anxiety of waiting 
time in wartime, for the later Bion it was waiting itself and 
thinking with others that came to be a ‘shelter’, a container, for 
an experience of time that enabled the possibility of an authentic 
‘psychological A.R.P.’.
By the summer of 1940, just after the waiting of the ‘Phoney 
War’ but before the Blitz was to bring total war to London, 
Melanie Klein was writing notes on her British patients’ 
experiences, observing that anxiety, if unprocessed, could lead 
to patients either acting rashly in the form of a manic evasion 
of threat, or otherwise falling prey to a dangerous paralysis: put 
another way, either not waiting long enough or waiting too 
long10. Klein has been criticised for interpreting her patients’ 
anxieties in relation to their inner psychic reality rather than as an 
understandable response to an external threat. But her point was 
10In the current situation, not waiting long enough is visible in panic buying or 
attempts to amplify prematurely the potential of as yet unproven treatments. Wait-
ing too long can be witnessed both in public health strategies and in individuals 
delaying accessing emergency care because of fears that acute care might expose 
them to danger, or that the provision for care has already been overwhelmed. In the 
first week after lockdown in the UK, A&E visits fell by 25% (Thornton, 2020).
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that what really mattered for any individual was their ability to 
understand their reactions to that external threat and respond with 
care and attention to what it demanded of them, rather than to act 
out anxieties that actually had their origins elsewhere, in their own 
past experiences.
In a lecture delivered in 1940, Klein noted that in the face of 
increasing existential threat, she saw some patients use their 
analysis to develop their capacity for thinking. She saw their 
‘courage grow, depression diminish, and the capacity to make 
decisions, etc. increase when hatred and guilt connected with 
early phantasies had been analysed’ (Klein, 1940). For Klein, it was 
precisely the capacity of analysis to contain and understand 
projective identifications, and the hatred and guilt that they 
produced, that enabled such patients not only to act carefully 
when required but to hold on to ‘the feeling that goodness cannot 
be ultimately exterminated’. Klein stated that this need to connect 
with ‘goodness’ in the moment might sometimes look like a 
temporary denial of the reality of historical danger: ‘We look 
at nature, we read a book, we play with a child, we enjoy food, 
etc., and we have to remind ourselves that our life and country 
is at stake’ (Klein, 1940). But, she noted, if this careful atten-
tion to ‘good objects’ is used not to deny reality but as a com-
mitment to the endurance of what might sustain us – the care 
of others and the care of a nourishing rather than contaminating 
world – it may ‘help us to take steps to preserve goodness exter-
nally, and may internally help us to keep calm in the face of 
danger’ (Klein, 1940). As Bion would later come to under-
stand it, the containment of various forms of mental distress is 
dependent on a person’s belief that there is some entity or func-
tion, both internal and external, that can endure ‘under fire’ and 
enable us to understand our thoughts and feelings.
These ideas of containment as a capacity for ‘thinking’ brought 
on to deal with ‘thoughts’ experienced as violent attacks on the 
mind were born from particular scenes of anxious threat during 
the twentieth century, but continue to have significance for our 
current times, we believe. As we have noted, following Maria 
Puig de la Bellacasa, care time works to make time of a very 
particular kind, suspending the future and distending the 
present by ‘thickening it with myriad multilateral demands’ 
(Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017, p. 207). As she puts it: ‘feelings 
of emergency and fear, as well as temporal projections, need 
often to be set aside in order to focus and get on with the 
tasks necessary to everyday caring maintenance’ (Puig de la 
Bellacasa, 2017, p. 207). Feelings of emergency that can produce 
a panicked sense that any action is better than waiting, alongside 
more amorphous fears of what the future may or may not bring, 
both need to be wound back while focusing in the present on 
the needs of others if care, in the sense described above, is 
to be provided. Such care thickens the time of the present; 
nevertheless, it also retains a weakened commitment to the future 
– an ‘after’ into which selves and others are imagined as endur-
ing. When linked to time, ‘after’ refers to a later, subsequent 
moment; but ‘after’, in many of its oldest usages, also means 
‘behind’. ‘Looking after’ might be understood as a process of 
putting the object of one’s care ahead of one’s own position 
at the very moment one is positioned ahead. We might say it 
entails the delay of the heart. To ‘look after’ thus suggests the 
capacity to hold oneself back, to get behind those being cared-
for, so that their needs can be responded to and they become the 
future towards one which is inclined. This is not any grand 
narrative of the future, but a rhythmic inclination that con-
sists of persistent and persisting attention: a form of thinking 
that produces time that finds its place in the inter-generation, 
understood broadly, between self and others, as self finds a 
future in its relationship with another into which it might lean.
Significantly, the most recent NICE guidelines on the treat-
ment of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, including in the wake 
of major disasters, have reinforced the 2003 recommenda-
tions of the value of psychological containment and delay – of 
‘watchful waiting’ (NICE, 2003). ‘Watchful waiting’, in this con-
text, steps back to enable immediate needs of shelter, food and 
clothing to be attended to. It does not offer complex psychological 
interventions too quickly; rather, it encourages the use of exist-
ing social and familial care networks for support, offering 
sufficient psycho-education and sense of presence through rep-
etition to enable people to access specialised services if and when 
they are required (NICE, 2003, p. 18). The evidence underpins 
the value of a strategic and thoughtful delay in action that 
requires services to contain their own anxiety and sense of emer-
gency sufficiently that ‘thoughts’ might not overwhelm their 
‘thinking’. Psychological therapies in this context might ‘look 
after’ us by both putting us ahead, while also waiting for us 
in our time of need. Such repetitions of care-ful attention and 
thinking, offered both as ‘watchful waiting’ and timely action, 
represent a commitment to a temporality of ‘looking after’; 
they affirm a belief in someone or something enduring through 
the bombardment of anxious ‘thoughts’ to produce a feeling of 
time that can be held on to long enough that it might be used.
Mitigation – on not being able to touch
The final part of the UK government’s tripartite strategy is 
‘mitigation’. It is triggered once a disease is widespread and it 
is no longer possible to either contain it or to slow its spread. 
Mitigation signals the belated shift to saving as many lives as 
possible and is the time of the most extreme measures coming 
into force: the use of the army on the streets to maintain public 
order; the closure of Parliament; the extreme enforcement of 
lockdown through centralised surveillance; and the rationing of 
care. Mitigation is an acknowledgement that containment and 
delay are no longer efficacious. If to mitigate is to attempt to 
make something already bad less severe, serious or painful, to 
lessen the gravity of an offence or mistake (OED), then while it 
admits a tendency to enact violence at the very point that care 
is needed, it also contains a shadow of acknowledgment that a 
mistake and an offence against care has indeed occurred.
In a healthcare context we can talk of mitigating pain, where 
pain is not just an offence to the body but includes the pain of 
psychological, social and spiritual suffering – what Cicely 
Saunders, the founder of the Hospice movement, named ‘total 
pain’. One of the core principles of palliative care is the refusal 
to separate bodily pain from its other social and cultural 
determinants when offering holistic mitigation of suffering at 
the end of life. As Yasmin Gunaratnam notes in Death and the 
Migrant (2013), although ‘pain needs a body’, relying on flesh 
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‘to register and receive it’ and ‘allow it passage’ (p. 133), it arises 
from multiple, often unacknowledged sources. In tracing the 
stories of ageing and dying in the health service for those who 
have migrated to the UK since World War II, including the 
many migrants who have cared for others within the health 
service (a disproportionate number of whom are now dying of 
COVID-19), she brings together Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of 
social suffering (Bourdieu, et al., 1999) with Saunders’ account 
of ‘total pain’ (Saunders, 1967). In doing so she works to 
recognize how pain is accrued and suffered over a lifetime 
(Gunaratnam, 2013, p. 137). Following this, we would suggest 
that mitigation, as a form of palliative care, needs to attend 
carefully to the total pain of COVID-19, and the conditions of 
radical uncertainty it produces, in ways that can respond to the 
multiple. This would acknowledge the suffering of individuals in 
the present, but would not erase the cumulative effects of ongoing 
racism and social inequality, the brutalities of neoliberalism that 
have damaged working conditions in the NHS and its capacity 
to care11, and the ongoing human-induced loss of habitats for 
non-human animals that have increased the likelihood of 
zoonotic disease transfer. All of these determinants, and more, 
find their ‘body’ in the person dying of COVID-19.
One of the threads that runs through Death and the Migrant is 
the social and political life of touch. In so many instances, care 
at the end of life entails profound experiences of touch – of 
washing and being washed, of being held, handled and caressed, 
of using the hands to express total pain by ‘praying’ through 
handling a rosary or ‘mala’. These experiences of touch counter 
the numerous forms of intrusive touch that also accompany 
illness and the end of life: being prodded and poked and instances 
of unwanted touch – experiences that are always already gendered 
and raced. Touch may be delivered violently; it might also be 
withheld as care fails. However, Gunaratnam draws our 
attention to the value of touch in cross-cultural palliative care as 
something that materialises a particular kind of ‘looking after’ 
when language and established procedures cannot necessarily 
make sense of what is needed. As Gunaratnam puts it: 
 Radical doubt and uncertainty are not unique to cross-cultural 
palliative care. They can surface in situations where routines 
of care become ineffective, where trust and communication 
breaks down and professionals have to work out and impro-
vise not just what to do, but also what kind of care they want 
to create and be part of. (Gunaratnam, 2013, p. 101)
Touch, offered in the space and time of radical uncertainty, 
speaks of the potential for new possibilities of mitigation and 
containment to be found; it also speaks of the permanent possibility 
that care might fail.
Perhaps one of the most difficult stories to emerge in the UK 
press to date has been the death of Ismail Mohamed Abdulwahab, 
who on the 1st April 2020 was the youngest person in the UK to 
die of COVID-19. What made his death particularly painful to 
know about was not just how young he was, and the inexplicability 
of why a young boy who appeared to have no underlying health 
conditions should die of COVID-19, but that he died alone. 
Because of the risk to his family’s health, he could not be 
touched, held and comforted by those who loved him. For patients 
in an induced coma on a ventilator in intensive care, this form 
of touch was initially prohibited, although on 15th April the UK 
Health Secretary described being ‘moved’ by stories of people 
dying alone and introduced new guidelines (Hancock, 2020). 
These guidelines permitted physical presence that would give 
‘people the chance to say goodbye’, while attempting to mitigate 
the risk of infection. But care in conditions of radical uncertainty 
has also been offered in other ways – in the form of Facetime 
or Zoom contact, for instance, which sometimes offers contain-
ment and mitigation of pain and sometimes fails. In the absence 
of routines of care that would usually involve physical proximity, 
we are being pushed to improvise and to decide what kind of 
care we want to create and be part of.
The psychoanalytic literature makes much of the importance 
of physical proximity and analyst and patient meeting and waiting 
together regularly. It is the regular repetition of the act of under-
standing and containment that produces the conditions in which 
thinking can take place and time can potentially be used rather 
than got rid of in unthinking action. Instead of waiting for 
something specific to happen, the emphasis is on waiting with 
and responding, in the present, and in the time of thinking, to the 
anxious bombardment of thoughts whose qualities can become 
knowable, in all their difficulty and violence. But how can we 
wait with one another under the conditions of a profoundly 
unknown and unknowable future; how can we wait together 
when physical proximity is the thing that must be avoided? It is 
perhaps worth remembering that, almost from the very beginning, 
psychoanalysis has taken place under the agreement that there 
should be no physical contact between analyst and patient12. 
This idea of holding in mind, emphasised by psychoanalyst 
D. W. Winnicott (1960), alongside Bion’s notion of psychological 
containment, indeed emerged in the name of an offer of contact 
through understanding rather than via material touch. But under 
material conditions of lockdown, or those that require a two- 
metre space between people, the idea of ‘holding’ in space might 
be less psychologically useful than the idea that there may be 
ways in which unbearable fear and anxiety can be contained 
within time. In a psychic imaginary now dominated by fears of 
contagion, of being invaded by ‘thoughts’ and anxieties that are 
as ‘viral’ as COVID-19 in their capacity to spread and to seep 
through domestic and bodily borders, a form of holding might 
still be able to occur through a sharing of verbal and embodied 
communication in time – a being with that enables containment in 
and of time.
How, then, might we think of using contact in time, a waiting 
with in time, as a way of containing the waiting time that 
COVID-19 has demanded of entire populations? It is clear that 
11See, also, Davies, 2020.
12Freud describes using techniques of hypnosis and touch in Studies in Hysteria, but 
stated in 1893 that the ‘talking cure’ should be undertaken without physical examina-
tion or the laying on of hands (see Freud, 1893). 
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virtual environments are already enabling some people to remain 
in contact in time. From psychoanalysis to Seders to birthday 
parties – communication technologies have been making more 
bearable the requirements of isolation and social distancing 
that might otherwise be experienced as intolerable, even as the 
withdrawal of touch for some communities produces losses that 
simply cannot be mitigated (see Anonymous, 2020b). For those 
able to use these technologies, the greater challenge might be 
remaining in contact with time itself, particularly with the time 
of waiting and delay. Waiting can be experienced as an intoler-
able impingement on freedom; it can also be easy for distraction 
to dominate when much of life starts to be lived online. Feelings 
of lack of agency can produce obsessive rituals of checking 
information that work as attempts to reinstate a feeling of time’s 
forward movement, but only fill the present by filling in for 
time’s ever-weakening dynamism (see Salisbury & Baraitser, 
2020). Isolation and social distancing are also palpably intensifying 
for some the demands of those sectors of the economy that were 
already or have been able to move swiftly online. Following the 
clear trends of neoliberal labour practices in which responsivity, 
availability and forms of affective labour have replaced 
clocking on and off, the sensation of capital occupying all areas 
of human life and of endless busyness has not left many of 
those whose work is deemed to be able to continue online. At 
the same time, those whose work outside of the home is deemed 
‘essential’, alongside many populations who live without the 
privilege of conditions that would enable social distancing or 
self-isolation to take place, endure the exhausting practices and 
anxieties associated with attempting to mitigate the essential 
vulnerability produced by coming into physical contact with 
others. While many people remain contained, more or less 
tolerably in more or less impermeable spaces, others face the 
discomfort, sometimes the agony, of containing their anxieties 
and using practices of decontamination and the physical barriers 
of Personal Protective Equipment to mitigate the fact that bodies 
are not impermeable and that contact with others is essential for 
material care.
It is understandable that the temporality of the urgent might be 
prioritised in the current circumstances. There are immediate 
needs and demands that need to be cared for. But it is also clear 
that the call to action that Bion suggested in 1940 was implicitly 
a call to thoughtful action rather something that might be used as 
an evasion of thinking. For Bion, thoughtful action required what 
he later called ‘patience’ – the possibility of containing the anxiety 
of uncertainty and using it instead as the ground for the possibility 
of thinking. As he went on to suggest, there is always pressure 
to ward off the uncertainty of not knowing by leaning on prior 
knowledge despite those circumstances no longer obtaining, 
or adopting a new certainty too quickly while excluding other 
elements that might bring a new pattern of meaning into view 
(Bion, 1970, p. 124). As Steve Hinchliffe (2020) has argued, the 
understandable tendency in the present COVID-19 crisis to 
lean on particular kinds of epidemiological models of evidence, 
partially because they have the virtue of imagining futures 
that seem potentially knowable and can be relatively simply 
communicated, risks filtering out other forms of experiential 
evidence that might be important in shaping an effective response 
to an ongoing and evolving situation. The capacity to keep 
thinking under conditions of radical uncertainty, to be open to 
the unknown and to the complexity of the present moment, 
can seem almost impossible when the pressure is on to act, to 
mitigate in conditions of urgency. Nevertheless, for Bion an 
openness to what is unknown enables a relationship between, 
rather than a confusion of, internal and external reality, and the 
formation of an alliance for thinking made in contact others that 
could suspend action until it is thinking’s precipitate, rather than 
its substitute.
Conclusions
The UK’s plan to follow a strategy of ‘containment, delay and 
mitigation’ implies a linear, progressive temporality, even though 
it has been clear, almost from the beginning, that the idea of 
moving from one phase on to another does not map easily on to 
the complex reality of a pandemic. At an explicitly political level, 
as the experiences of South Korea and Germany are suggesting, 
delay and mitigation should not be thought of as simply super-
seding strategies of containment – testing, quarantine and 
contact tracing – even after it is clear that the virus is spreading 
in the community and even though such containment is resource 
heavy. Maybe it is obvious that containment of the virus can 
never be separated from the need to delay and to mitigate. But 
perhaps it needs to be reaffirmed at this point that any future 
mitigation must not throw aside all attempts to stay with practices 
of care that seek to contain and delay cases of COVID-19, if it 
is not to inflict ‘horrorism’ and abandonment at the moment when 
care is still needed.
We have argued here that by thinking the terms containment, 
delay and mitigation through in psychosocial terms and within 
a more enfolded and recursive temporality, we might be able to 
keep more in touch with and learn something from the failures 
that are always a possibility within any caring encounter. To be 
explicit, this requires thinking the temporality of the response 
to COVID-19 in a more care-ful fashion, as a time that would 
enable the figures of containment, delay and mitigation to hover 
and adjust themselves in relation to one another. Our point is that 
this more recursive temporality of repeating and returning is likely 
to be able to know more about ongoing violence as it holds back 
from narratives of battles to be won. Such a temporality might, in 
turn, allow us to know more about the ever-present possibility of 
failures of care that get written out of discourses of healthcare 
heroism – to know how such failures occur, what they might 
communicate and something about how such failures could be 
contained, delayed or mitigated. We have circled back to a point 
in twentieth-century history that was also concerned with an 
existential threat requiring a response from a whole population, 
but we have done this not in the name of invoking a fantasised 
narrative of ‘Blitz spirit’. Instead, we have suggested that the 
British psychoanalytic tradition born of that moment insisted 
that one must keep thinking while ‘under fire’ and that there are 
possibilities of containing unbearable anxiety and the capacity 
for violence in the intersubjective space and time between 
people. This commitment to thinking in and with the process of 
delay and containment might yet be drawn upon as we inhabit 
this time of waiting – waiting that is the management and 
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mitigation of a future threat, but also a time of care in and for the 
present.
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Lisa Baraitser and Laura Salisbury take up the three terms used in the UK government’s political strategy
for dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic - containment, delay, mitigation - and subject these terms to a
psychosocial reading. What this translation makes possible is the production of the time and space
necessary for thinking through the relation between care and violence, and between thought and action,
in the midst of the current crisis. By refusing a teleology that frames the disease in terms of a
forward-moving momentum leaving little time for reflection, they argue for a recursive response, one that
more accurately mirrors the “complex trajectories” of the disease itself. Through a series of iterative
meditations, they invite their readers to pay attention to the ways that “care” might result in failure, for
example, when “delay” becomes abandonment and those most in need of care are subjected to the
violence of care’s failure.
Making their arguments in concert with a range of voices - from Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler to
British psychoanalysis and Adriana Cavarero’s thinking through of “horrorism” - Baraitser and Salisbury
explore the generative possibilities of delay and call for a rupture within self-reproducing thought that
makes room for what David Applebaum calls the “delay of the heart”. Within this rupture, they argue, we
might be able to live through the crisis of the pandemic while at the same time confronting the violence of
governmental responses that have resulted in a failure of care. It is only through this “care-ful” attention to
systemic violence that we might move forward into a survivable future. They conclude with a section on
mitigation that revolves around the experience of touch. Framing touch as having the potential to do
violence as well as bring comfort, they nevertheless suggest that there is hope in proximity as it holds the
promise of alliance, a bridge between the internal and external, and a placing the self and other in more
ethical relation.
I am both moved and convinced by Baraitser and Salisbury’s intervention and have only one suggestion.
In   (2004), Judith Butler confronts the ethical failures of a regime that deems certain livesPrecarious Life
grievable and others dispensable. She is also critical of a government that refuses to give grief its
necessary time in favour of pursuing unreflective violent action. It seems that we are being returned to this
earlier moment and being given yet another opportunity to confront familiar forms of violence.
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This is a thoughtful analysis of the UK government’s phased response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which
elaborates the temporal dimensions of ‘containment: delay: mitigation’ through a focus on care. The paper
draws attention to the, often overlooked, centrality of time to the pandemic, analysing closely the
intricacies of the different phases and their implications for how care is (and isn’t) done, and for the
possibilities of doing care otherwise. The argument is sophisticated and nuanced. It draws out the
specificities of time and care to understanding COVID-19 and also, in my opinion, makes points that have
wider resonance – for example, with respect to how time and care work more generally in the NHS,
palliative care and in psychoanalytic encounters. Indeed, a real strength of the piece is in its
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 palliative care and in psychoanalytic encounters. Indeed, a real strength of the piece is in its
contextualisation of the responses to the pandemic within longer histories of care in medicalised
situations. This focus on care and time is original and makes important contributions to understandings of
health and medicine. I appreciated the argument that time must be understood as recursive and
non-linear, and how this was embedded in the structure of the discussion which begins with delay in order
to understand containment and mitigation. The literature that is drawn on is appropriate to the authors’
concerns and is mobilised in the service of a novel argument (rather than relied upon to make an
argument).
 
I have very few comments or suggestions on the paper, as I found it compelling and persuasive. The
argument is complex as is appropriate to the topic and aims of the piece. I wondered whether the authors
might explicate a couple of points of discussion in order to provide a bit more detail for readers unfamiliar
with some of the literature. For example, Cavarero’s argument about ‘horrorism’ seemed important to the
argument; could the discussion of it be expanded? On this point, I also wondered whether it could be
pulled through in the latter parts of the paper, especially as it is mentioned in the abstract. Similarly,
regarding the definition of mitigation as an acknowledgment that care has not been sufficiently taken, is
this of any relevance to the broader argument about touch, holding and waiting developed in this section?
In other words, I wondered whether a bit more could be made of mitigation, not only as a phase in the
response to COVID-19 but in what it refers to and signals. I think this point is latent in the argument and
could perhaps be drawn out further.
 
These comments are made in the context of what is an excellent article. I am looking forward to reading
the paper again once it is finalised.
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